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In	  the	  introduction	  to	  The	  Ecocriticism	  Reader:	  Landmarks	  in	  Literary	  Ecology,	  one	  of	  the	  flagship	  texts	  of	  
ecocriticism,	   Cheryll	   Glotfelty	   recalls	   advice	   she	   received	   from	   environmentalist	   Wallace	   Stegner	   on	  
developing	  a	  “branding	  system”	  for	  what	  she	  refers	   to	  as	  a	  “mixed	  herd”	  of	  scattered	  ecocritics	   (xxii).	  
Stegner	   suggested	   that	   ecocriticism	   be	   allowed	   to	   remain	   “large	   and	   loose	   and	   suggestive	   and	   open,	  
simply	   literature	   and	   the	   environment	   and	   all	   the	   ways	   they	   interact	   and	   have	   interacted”	   (qtd.	   in	  
Glotfelty	  xxii),	  and,	  considering	  this	  advice,	   it's	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  he	  would	  be	  quite	  happy	  with	  the	  way	  
that	  the	  field	  has	  developed	  since	  the	  Reader's	  publication.	  Today,	  ecocritics	  not	  only	  study	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	   literature	   and	   the	   environment	   interact	   and	   have	   interacted,	   they	   have	   also	   cultivated	   an	  
interdisciplinary	  interest,	  extending	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  work	  into	  the	  fields	  of	  environmental	  philosophy	  
and	  bioethics	  as	  well	  as	  the	  environmental	  sciences,	  especially	  ecology	  (Tiffin	  12);	  however,	  what	  exactly	  
the	   resulting	  multifarious	  discourse	   is	  depends	  on	  who	   you	   ask.	   Twenty-­‐first	   century	   ecocriticism	   is	   a	  
field	   both	  wonderfully	   diverse	   and	   so	   ideologically	   fragmented	   as	   a	   result	   of	   that	  wonderful	   diversity	  
that	  ecocritics	  rarely	  agree	  on	  what	  the	  major	  questions	  in	  the	  field	  are,	   let	  alone	  how	  best	  to	  answer	  
them.	  	  
	  
Yet,	   it	   is	   this	   fragmentation	   that	   gives	   ecocriticism	   its	   vibrancy,	   its	   continued	   and	   even	   increasing	  
relevance.	   Glotfelty's	   Reader	   was	   published	   in	   1996,	   eighteen	   years	   after	   William	   Rueckert	   first	  
introduced	   the	   term	   “ecocriticism,”1	   and	   yet	  Glotfelty's	  main	   goal,	   through	   three	  hundred	  ninety-­‐one	  
pages	  and	  twenty-­‐five	  collected	  essays,	  was	  still	   to	  answer	  the	  question	  “What	   is	  ecocriticism?”	  (xxvi).	  
Many	  of	  the	  essays	  included	  in	  the	  Reader	  are	  in	  direct	  conversation	  –	  if	  not	  outright	  argument	  –	  with	  
one	  another	  and	  even	   today	  –	   sixteen	  years	   later	   still	   –	   “What	   is	  ecocriticism?”	   is	   a	  question	  with	  no	  
easy	  answer.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be.	  As	  a	  discipline	  that	  is	  connected	  to	  literary	  theory	  by	  the	  dual	  bridges	  of	  culture	  
and	  science	  –	  a	  culture	  that	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  its	  culpability	  in	  worldwide	  environmental	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destruction	  through	  the	  work	  of	  science	  –	  ecocriticism	  would	  be	  worse	  than	  useless	  if	  it	  was	  unable	  to	  
reinvent	   itself	   in	   the	   face	   of	   this	   growing	   environmental	   awareness.	   It	   continues	  –	   appropriately	   –	   to	  
adapt,	  not	  unlike	  the	  ecosystems	  that	  it	  discusses.	  
	  
So,	   how	   does	   one	   define	   the	   parameters	   of	   a	   critical	   discourse	   that	   can't	   agree	   on	   its	   own	   tenets?	   I	  
suggest	   that	   instead	   of	   searching	   for	   a	   definition	   of	   ecocriticism	   in	   the	   answers	   it	   provides,	   we	   look	  
instead	  at	  the	  questions	  it	  asks.	  There	  are	  many,	  for	  certain,	  but	  a	  few	  stand	  out:	  the	  Big	  Questions	  that	  
are	   the	   most	   repeated	   and	   that	   can	   often	   be	   glimpsed	   lurking	   behind	   many	   smaller	   questions.	   By	  
enumerating	   these	   Big	  Questions	   and	   synthesizing	   some	   of	   the	  most	   important	   responses	   to	   them,	   I	  
hope	  to	  be	  able	  to	  create	  a	  skeleton	  –	  if	  you	  will	  –	  upon	  which	  the	  muscles	  of	  ecocriticism	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  
work.	   I	  will	   then	  extrapolate	   from	  this	  model	   to	  critique	   the	   thesis	  of	  Timothy	  Morton's	  book	  Ecology	  
Without	  Nature	  and,	  through	  that	  critique,	  suggest	  a	  constructive	  revision	  of	  Morton's	  idea	  of	  “ecology	  
without	  nature,”	  a	  conceptual	  mode	  of	  responsible,	  ecological	  living	  that	  I	  label	  “nature	  as	  ecology.”	  
The	  Biggest	  Question:	  What	  Is	  “Nature”?	  
Central	  to	  ecocriticism	  is	  the	  question	  of	  “nature”:	  what	  is	  it,	  and	  what	  is	  our	  relationship	  to	  it?	  I	  ask	  this	  
second	   question	   since	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   we	   have	   the	   word	   “nature”	   in	   our	   vocabulary	   implies	   our	  
assumption	   of	   a	   fundamental	   separation	   or	   intentional	   distinction	   from	   it.	   Nature	   is	   that	   thing	   Over	  
There,	   somewhere	   that	   we	   choose	   go	   to,	   something	   that	   we	   can	   either	   take	   part	   in	   or	   avoid	   as	   we	  
choose.	  What's	  more,	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  word	  also	   implies	   that,	   far	   from	  being	   something	  natural2,	  
nature	   itself	   is	   a	   very	   human	   idea.	  We've	   created	   a	   label	   for	   those	   places	   that	  we	   perceive	   as	   being	  
qualitatively	  apart	  from	  our	  “civilized”	  places.	  	  
	  
Contrary	  to	  how	  we	  often	  use	  the	  word	  in	  a	  sentence,	  “nature”	  is	  not	  just	  a	  thing,	  or	  a	  place,	  or	  even	  a	  
state	  of	  being.	  It	  is	  actually,	  as	  Morton	  explains	  in	  Ecology	  Without	  Nature,	  “a	  transcendental	  term	  in	  a	  
material	   mask”	   (14).	   Nature	   “stands	   at	   the	   end	   of	   a	   potentially	   infinite	   series	   of	   other	   terms	   that	  
collapse	  into	  it	  [and]	  a	  metonymic	  series	  […]	  becomes	  a	  metaphor”	  (14).	  As	  a	  stand-­‐in	  for	  a	  near-­‐endless	  
parade	  of	  other	  terms,	  then,	  “nature”	  becomes,	  on	  one	  level,	  meaningless	  in	  and	  of	  itself:	  it	  means	  the	  
trees,	   the	   ocean,	   the	  mountains,	   the	   sunlight,	   etc.,	   but	   never	   has	   a	  meaning	   of	   its	   own.	  Morton	   also	  
suggests,	   though,	   that	   on	   another	   level,	   nature	   is	   a	   norming	   force.	   Something	   that	   is	   “unnatural”	   is	  
against	   the	   norm	   (14).	   On	   this	   second	   level,	   we	   even	   see	   ourselves	   as	   unnatural,	   apart	   from	   the	  
metonymy	  of	  “nature.”	  The	  struggle	  to	  reconcile	  these	  two	  senses	  of	  nature	  –	  both	  as	  a	  palimpsest	  of	  
our	  embodied	  experiences	  of	  so-­‐called	  natural	  places	  and	  as	  everything	  from	  which	  the	  post-­‐Lapsarian	  
human	  has	  been	  estranged	  –	  is	  a	  paradox	  with	  which	  ecocriticism	  is	  deeply	  engaged.	  
	  
But,	   what	   if	   “nature”	   is	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   paradox	   in	   the	   first	   place?	   Is	   understanding	   the	   human	  
relationship	   to	   nature	   the	   key	   to	   finding	   the	   human	   place	   in	   the	   world	   ecosystem,	   or	   is	   all	   of	  
ecocriticism's	  talk	  of	  nature	  merely	  masking	  the	  real	   issue:	  that	  by	  making	  “nature”	  a	  topic	  of	   literary,	  
scientific,	   and	   cultural	   consideration	   we've	   only	   further	   distanced	   ourselves	   from	   it?	   	   While	  
deconstructing	   the	   aims	   of	   ecocriticism	   in	  Ecology	  Without	  Nature,	  Morton	   argues	   for	   this	   very	   idea:	  
that	  even	  having	  an	  idea	  of	  “nature”	  is	  counterintuitive	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  an	  “ecological	  state	  of	  human	  
society”	  (1).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  live	  as	  responsible	  members	  of	  an	  ecological	  world	  system,	  we	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must	   abandon	   the	   idea	   of	   “nature”	   and,	   by	   extension,	   the	   man/nature	   dichotomy	   that	   our	   idea	   of	  
“civilized”	  society	  is	  built	  on.	  For	  Morton,	  only	  dissolving	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  “nature”	  idea	  can	  allow	  
us	   to	   successfully	   function	   ecologically.	   Could	   it	   be	   that	   in	   studying	   man's	   relationship	   to	   nature,	  
ecocriticism	  is	  directly	  damaging	  that	  relationship	  by	  insisting	  upon	  the	  nature-­‐concept?	  
	  
Ecocriticism	  is	  certainly	  guilty	  –	  at	  times,	  at	  least	  –	  of	  perpetuating	  the	  man/nature	  dichotomy.	  Consider	  
as	   one	   example	   the	   field's	   treatment	   of	   what's	   often	   classified	   in	   capital-­‐“L”	   Literature	   as	   “nature	  
writing.”	   Despite	   ecocritical	   veneration	   of	   writers	   like	   Edward	   Abbey,	   Aldo	   Leopold,	   and	   John	   Muir,	  
there	   is	   a	   conceit	   at	   work	   in	   such	   writers'	   composed	   retellings	   of	   adventures	   in	   so-­‐called	   nature,	   a	  
conceit	  that	  becomes	  all	  the	  more	  obvious	  as	  more	  time	  passes,	  and	  more	  forests	  are	  replaced	  by	  cities.	  
Morton	  describes	  this	  conceit	  thusly:	  “Nature	  writing	  tries	  to	  be	  'immediate'	  […]	  but	  this	  can	  only	  be	  a	  
supreme	  illusion,	  ironically,	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  one	  can	  find	  Coke	  cans	  in	  Antarctica.	  The	  immediacy	  that	  
nature	  writing	   values	   is	   itself	   reified	   as	   a	   Coke	   can”	   (125).	   He	   goes	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   “Nature	  writing	  
partly	  militates	  against	  ecology	   rather	   than	   for	   it.	   By	   setting	   up	  nature	   as	   an	   object	   “over	   there”	   –	   a	  
pristine	  wilderness	  beyond	  all	  trace	  of	  human	  contact	  –	  it	  re-­‐establishes	  the	  very	  separation	  it	  seeks	  to	  
abolish”	   (125).	   In	   establishing	   a	   distinction	   between	   “nature”	   and	   “ecology”	   –	   his	   “ecology”	   being,	  
broadly,	  the	   idea	  that	  the	  world	   is	  made	  up	  of	  sociobiological	  systems	  and	  that	  to	  be	  “in	  nature”	   is	  to	  
simply	  understand	  and	  accept	  our	  responsibility	  as	  a	  species	  living	  within	  these	  systems	  –	  Morton	  clearly	  
illustrates	   traditional	  nature	  writing's	  one-­‐step-­‐forward-­‐two-­‐steps-­‐back	  hypocrisy.	  Certainly,	   this	  genre	  
can	  make	  us	  aware	  of	  our	  unnatural	  effects	  on	  natural	  places3,	  but	  does	  this	  awareness	  outweigh	  the	  
simultaneous	  reification	  of	  the	  man/nature	  dichotomy?	  	  	  
	  
Even	  more	   fundamentally,	  we	   should	  question	   to	  what	  degree	  nature	  writing	   communicates	   to	  us	  an	  
unmediated,	  natural	  experience	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  We	  have,	  in	  practice,	  fully	  infiltrated	  this	  natural	  world	  
that	  we	  wish	   to	  observe	   in	   its	   supposedly	  pristine	   form	  through	  books	   like	  Abbey's	  Desert	  Solitaire:	  A	  
Season	   in	   the	   Wilderness.	   It	   has	   long	   been	   known	   in	   more	   scientific	   disciplines	   that	   one	   cannot	   be	  
perfectly	  removed	  from	  that	  which	  one	  wishes	  to	  observe,	  and	  yet	  this	  consequence	  of	  observation	   is	  
often	   not	   considered	   in	   ecocritical	   responses	   to	   nature	   writing.	   Morton	   suggests	   that	   “[w]e	   could	  
address	   this	   problem	   by	   considering	   the	   role	   of	   subjectivity	   in	   nature	  writing.	  What	   kinds	   of	   subject	  
position	  does	  nature	  writing	  evoke?	  	  Instead	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  trees,	  look	  at	  the	  person	  who	  looks	  at	  the	  
trees”	   (125).	   To	  put	  Morton's	   suggestion	   into	   action,	   let	   us	  briefly	   consider	  Don	   Scheese's	   passionate	  
defense	  of	  Abbey's	  “nature	  writer”	  status	  in	  the	  essay	  “Desert	  Solitaire:	  Counter-­‐Friction	  to	  the	  Machine	  
in	  the	  Garden”.4	  	  
	  
Scheese	  characterizes	  Abbey	  as	  being	  in	  the	  nature-­‐writing	  vein	  of	  Thoreau,	  Muir,	  and	  Leopold,	  claiming	  
that	  he	  “is	  yet	  one	  more	   inhabitor	  of	   the	  wild”	   (304).5	  But	  what	  “wild”	   is	  Scheese	  talking	  about?	   	  The	  
desert	  trailer	  –	  complete	  with	  a	  refrigerator	  stocked	  weekly	  from	  the	  local	  grocery	  –	  that	  Abbey	  lives	  in	  
during	   the	   time	   written	   about	   in	   Desert	   Solitaire?	   	   How	   does	   our	   hearing	   Abbey's	   experience	  
secondhand	  give	  us	  any	  insight	  into	  living	  ecologically?	  Worse	  yet,	  what	  unintended	  consequences	  does	  
Abbey's	  presence	  in	  the	  desert	  have?	  	  Whether	  we	  answer	  this	  question	  on	  a	  small	  scale	  (consider	  the	  
poor	  rabbit	  he	  impulsively	  brains	  with	  a	  rock	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  Getting	  Closer	  To	  Nature),	  or	  a	  large	  scale	  
(the	  impact	  on	  Arches	  National	  Monument	  due	  to	  increases	  in	  tourism	  throughout	  the	  canyonlands	  of	  
the	  American	   southwest	   caused	  directly	  by	   the	  popularity	  of	  Abbey's	  books),	   the	  answer	   remains	   the	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same:	  nature	  is	  made	  unnatural	  by	  the	  imposition	  of	  any	  member	  of	  a	  culture	  that	  upholds	  the	  idea	  of	  
pristine,	  “natural”	  places.	  
	  
So,	  then,	  what	  would	  a	  world	  without	  “nature”	   look	   like?	   	  Contrary	  to	  Morton's	  too-­‐cynical	  argument,	  
there	   is	  a	  school	  of	  thought	  within	  ecocriticism	  –	   largely	  working	   interdisciplinarily	  between	  literature,	  
anthropology,	  archeology,	  and	  cultural	  studies	  –	  that	  presents	  the	  argument	  that	  not	  only	  is	  it	  possible	  
for	  a	  human	  society	  to	  be	  “in”	  nature	  –	  thus	  achieving	  Morton's	  “ecology	  without	  nature”	  in	  an	  indirect	  
way	   –	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   that	   very	   type	   of	   society	  which	   dominates	   our	   genetic	   and	   cultural	   past.	   By	   briefly	  
surveying	   the	   ecocritical	   discourse	   surrounding	   pre-­‐Lapsarian	   human	   culture,	   we	   can	   shed	   light	   on	  
where	  “nature”	  came	  from,	  as	  well	  as	  consider	  where	  it	  –	  and	  we	  –	  may	  be	  going.	  	  
Prehistory	  and	  the	  Plow:	  Where	  Does	  “Nature”	  Come	  From?	  
Let	  us	   take	  a	   look	  at	  what	  ecocritical	  discourse	  has	   to	   say	  on	   the	  historical	  origins	  of	   the	  man/nature	  
dichotomy.	  Archeology	  and	  anthropology	   tell	  us	   that	   the	  Fall	  of	  Man	  –	   the	  movement	   from	  a	  hunting	  
and	  gathering	  lifestyle	  to	  settled	  agriculture	  that	  is	  most	  popularly	  symbolized	  in	  the	  West	  by	  the	  Eden	  
story	  –	  took	  place	  between	  eight	  and	  twelve	  thousand	  years	  ago.6	  This	  historical	  moment	  is	  significant	  in	  
ecocritical	   discourse,	   as	   both	   permanent	   settlements	   and	   sustained	   agriculture	   are	   cultural	  
manifestations	  of	   the	  post-­‐Lapsarian	   idea	   that	   the	  natural	  world	   can	  be	   consumed	  as	   a	   resource	   and	  
that	  ecosystems	  can	  be	  fully	  understood	  and	  controlled	  through	  the	  employment	  of	  technology.	  	  
	  
The	  human	  shift	   to	   settled	  agriculture	  could	  also	  be	   seen	  as	   the	  historical	  moment	  at	  which	  “nature”	  
became	   part	   of	  man's	   vocabulary,7	   both	   literally	   and	   culturally.	   But	   let's	   not	   get	   ahead	   of	   ourselves.	  
What	   if	   it	   wasn't	   the	   physical	   practice	   of	   settled	   agriculture	   that	   created	   the	   nature/man	   divide,	   but	  
instead	  something	  even	  more	  fundamental	  to	  the	  way	  we	  see	  the	  world?	  	  Paul	  Shepard's	  book	  Coming	  
Home	  to	  the	  Pleistocene	  gives	  us	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  deep	  our	  acceptance	  of	  this	  harmful	  dichotomy	  might	  
run.	  	  
	  
Shepard	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  invention	  of	  agriculture	  or	  the	  idea	  of	  landowning	  that	  separated	  us	  
from	  nature,	  but	  instead	  the	  advent	  of	  written	  history.	  As	  he	  tells	   it,	   it	  was	  Hebrew	  “demythologizers”	  
who	  “created	  a	  reality	  outside	  the	  rhythmic	  cosmos	  of	  the	  gentiles	  who	  surrounded	  them	  and	  who	  were	  
grounded	   in	   prehistoric,	   mythical	   consciousness	   with	   rituals	   of	   eternal	   return”	   (8).	   William	   Cronon	  
agrees,	  asserting	  a	  parallel	  between	  the	  advent	  of	  written	  history,	  linear	  time,	  and	  monotheism:	  “Nature	  
in	  Western	   culture	   is	   the	   product	   of	   a	  monotheistic	   religious	   tradition;	   it	   is	   often	   unrecognizable	   for	  
people	  whose	  cultures	  have	  not	  taught	  them	  to	  worship	  a	  lone	  deity”	  (35).	  Cronon's	  claim	  is	  borne	  out	  
by	   recent	   research	   performed	   on	   existing	   polytheistic	   and	   animistic	   hunter-­‐gatherer	   cultures	   like	   the	  
!Kung	  San.	   It	   is	  basically	   impossible	  to	  overstate	  the	   impact	  that	  the	  development	  of	  monotheism	  had	  
on	  human	  culture,8	  but	  it	  is	  just	  as	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  it	  had	  on	  the	  world	  ecosystem,	  by	  
indirectly	  spawning	  man's	  belief	  in	  his	  superiority	  to	  the	  natural	  world.	  	  
	  
By	  employing	  written	  history	  rather	  than	  an	  oral	  tradition,	  the	  Hebrews	  changed	  humanity's	  concept	  of	  
time.	   Prehistorically	   experienced	   as	   a	   circle,	   a	   cycle,	   time	  was	   instead	  made	   linear	   as	   specific	   events	  
were	  preserved	  beyond	  their	  immediate	  duration	  in	  writing	  (9).	  As	  Judaism	  flourished,	  this	  idea	  of	  linear	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time	   spread,	   bringing	   with	   it	   dire	   ecological	   consequences.	   Lynn	   White,	   Jr.	   explains	   that	   “the	  
intellectuals	  of	  the	  ancient	  West	  denied	  that	  the	  visible	  world	  had	  had	  a	  beginning.	  Indeed,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
beginning	  was	  impossible	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  their	  cyclical	  notion	  of	  time.	  In	  sharp	  contrast,	  Christianity	  
inherited	  from	  Judaism	  not	  only	  a	  concept	  of	  time	  as	  nonrepetitive	  and	  linear	  but	  also	  a	  striking	  story	  of	  
creation”	   (9).9	   Linearity	   of	   time	   not	   only	   introduced	   and	   enforced	   that	   idea	   with	   which	   all	   we	   post-­‐
Industrial-­‐Revolution	   Westerners	   are	   now	   so	   familiar	   –	   Progress	   –	   but	   the	   Christian	   creation	   story	  
includes	   an	   injunction	   from	  God	  Himself	   that	  man	   should	   “Be	   fruitful	   and	  multiply;	   fill	   the	   earth	   and	  
subdue	  it;	  have	  dominion	  over	  the	  fish	  of	  the	  sea,	  over	  the	  birds	  of	  the	  air,	  and	  over	  every	  living	  thing	  
that	  moves	  on	  the	  earth”	  (The	  Bible,	  Gen.	  1.28,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  
	  
Our	  severance	  from	  mythic	  time	  has	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  us	  as	  a	  people	  trying	  to	  find	  our	  
way	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  we	  see	  ourselves	  as	  being	  apart	  from	  the	  natural.	  “The	  nature	  of	  the	  primitive	  
world	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  our	  modern	  anxiety	  about	  [change],”	  claims	  Shepard,	  “because	  history	  cannot	  
resolve	  for	  us	  the	  problem	  of	  change,	  which	  was	  mythically	  assured	  for	  many	  thousands	  of	  years	  as	  a	  
form	  of	  renewal”	  (11).	  History	  forces	  us	  to	  lose	  touch	  with	  our	  natural,	  biological	  heritage	  because	  “we	  
humans	   are	   not	   now	  what	  we	  once	  were	   –	   bacteria	   or	   quadruped	  mammals	   or	   apish	   hominids”	   and	  
since	  history	  sees	  the	  time	  in	  which	  we	  were	  those	  things	  as	  “past,”	  “other	  forms	  of	  life	  are	  irrelevant”	  
(11).	  The	  severance	  from	  nature	  caused	  by	  our	  development	  of	  linear	  time	  is	  ultimately	  –	  ironically	  –	  a	  
cycle	  of	  self-­‐reinforcement;	  the	  further	  in	  time	  we	  move	  from	  the	  original	  crisis	  point,	  the	  harder	  it	  is	  for	  
us	   to	   resist	   equating	   “prehistoric”	   with	   “primitive.”10	   	   Worse	   yet,	   this	   fundamental	   metaphysical	  
severance	  began	  to	  manifest	  serious	  real-­‐world	  ecological	  consequences	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  agriculture.	  
	  
I	  will	  refrain	  from	  giving	  too	  thorough	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  agriculture	  on	  the	   land,	  and	  on	  man's	  
relationship	   to	   it	   before	  modern	   (i.e.	  medieval)	   times	   –	  much	   can	  be	   inferred	   from	  what	   I've	   already	  
discussed,	  and	  I	  don't	  want	  to	  belabor	  the	  point.11	  However,	  the	  medieval	  period,	  especially	  in	  Western	  
Europe,	  deserves	  special	  consideration,	  as	  it	  is	  during	  that	  age	  that	  man	  makes	  the	  leap	  from	  “primitive”	  
settled	   agriculture	   to	   the	   first	   forms	   of	   truly	   industrialized	   agriculture	   –	   the	   mechanism	   that	   would	  
eventually	   become	   today's	   monocultured	   fields	   and	   factory	   farms.	   Lynn	   White,	   Jr.	   provides	   more	  
compelling	   evidence	   that	   this	   change	   was	   not	   merely	   a	   technological	   but	   also	   a	   sociocultural	   one.	  
Starting	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  seventh	  century,	  certain	  northern	  European	  peasants	  started	  to	  employ	  
a	  new,	  more	  efficient	  sort	  of	  plow.	  This	  new	  plow	  was	  much	  more	  effective	  than	  old-­‐style	  plows,	  but	  as	  
a	   function	  of	   this	   increased	  efficiency,	   it	   required	   the	  use	  of	  eight	  oxen	   instead	  of	   the	  usual	   two.	  This	  
required	  families	  to	  pool	  their	  oxen	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  land	  was	  no	  longer	  divvied	  up	  on	  a	  per-­‐family	  basis	  
–	  as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  previously	  –	  but	  instead	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  or	  another	  plow-­‐team's	  capacity	  for	  
production	  (8).	  	  	  	  
	  
Clearly,	  this	  was	  a	  dramatic	  change	  in	  the	  way	  that	  people	  related	  to	  the	  land.	  White	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  
that	  this	  type	  of	  plow	  and	  the	  landowning	  system	  that	  was	  ushered	  in	  to	  deal	  with	  it	  was	  unique	  in	  the	  
world	   at	   the	   time	   (8).	   He	   closes	   by	   asking:	   “Is	   it	   coincidence	   that	   modern	   technology,	   with	   its	  
ruthlessness	   toward	   nature,	   has	   so	   largely	   been	   produced	   by	   descendants	   of	   these	   peasants	   from	  
northern	   Europe?”	   (8).	   Through	   industrial	   agriculture,	   medieval	   Westerners	   formalized	   a	   break	   with	  
nature	  in	  practice	  that	  had	  been	  executed	  in	  theory	  long	  before.	  That	  break	  was	  then	  later	  perpetuated	  
across	  the	  globe	  along	  with	  its	  Western	  progenitors.	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Through	   Shepard's	   and	   White,	   Jr.'s	   work,	   Morton's	   basic	   contention	   that	   “nature”	   is	   a	   man-­‐made	  
construct	  endemic	  to	  (at	   least)	  Western	  culture	   is	  borne	  out,	   leaving	  the	  question:	  “what	  now?”	  Well,	  
for	  starters,	  this	  puts	  ecocriticism	  at	  odds	  with	  itself	  –	  again.	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  field	  often	  fails	  to	   look	  
beyond	  the	  man/nature	  dichotomy	  –	  sometimes	  even	  intentionally	  emphasizing	  it	  for	  added	  effect,	  as	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  its	  veneration	  of	  traditional	  nature	  writers	  –	  and	  so	  it	  sees	  our	  place	  as	  stewards	  of	  a	  nature	  
that	  can't	  protect	  itself	  from	  us.	  Yet	  we've	  also	  now	  seen	  a	  discourse	  that	  provides	  an	  alternative	  to	  this	  
view,	   one	   that	   could	   potentially	   propagate	   a	  more	   constructive	   view	   of	  man's	   legacy	   with	   regard	   to	  
nature.	  	  
	  
If	   we	   are	   well	   and	   truly	   estranged	   from	   nature,	   and	   have	   been	   quite	   literally	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	  
recorded	   history,	   how	   do	   we	   respond	   to	   the	   last	   two	   centuries	   of	   increasing	   environmental	   crisis	  
without	  simply	  reifying	  that	  estrangement?	  William	  Cronon	  indirectly	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  such	  a	  more-­‐
constructive	   ecocriticism	  when	   he	   points	   out	   that	   “the	   ideas	   that	   'history	   begins	   at	   Sumer,'	   that	   the	  
modern	  age	  caps	  a	  human	  project	  started	  in	  antiquity,	  and	  that	  the	  story	  of	  humankind	  rests	  in	  triumph	  
over	   the	  malevolent	   forces	  of	  nature	  cannot	  withstand	  critical	   scrutiny.	   Indeed,	   they	  beg	   for	  criticism,	  
for	  deconstruction”	  (7).	  I	  believe	  that	  performing	  this	  deconstruction	  is	  a	  niche	  that	  ecocriticism	  needs	  
to	  fill.	  
Progress	  and	  the	  Pastoral:	  How	  Do	  We	  Respond	  to	  Environmental	  Crisis?	  
The	   Western	   cultural	   response	   to	   our	   estrangement	   from	   nature	   –	   greatly	   exacerbated	   by	   the	  
environmental	  awareness	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  during	  the	  Industrial	  Age	  –	  can	  be	  seen	  broadly	  as	  having	  
taken	   two	   forms.12	  First,	  we	  have	   in	  many	  ways	  chosen	   to	  deal	  with	   this	  estrangement	  by	   ignoring	   it.	  
More	   specifically,	   we	   have	   chosen	   to	   worship	   –	   in	   a	   secular	   sense	   –	   Progress	   instead	   of	   ecology.	  
Ecocriticism's	   consideration	   of	   the	   Western	   fascination	   with	   Progress	   is	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	  
something	  significant	  changes	   in	  our	  relationship	  to	  nature	  with	  the	  cultural	  acceptance	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  
the	  mind/body	   split	   as	   far	   back	   as	   Plato.	   The	   agricultural	   Fall	   from	   nature	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	  
section	  happened	  in	  various	  times	  and	  in	  various	  places	  for	  various	  reasons	  (Shepard	  81),	  and	  although	  
its	   ultimate	   effect	  might	   have	   been	   to	   further	   distance	   humans	   from	  nature,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   to	  
show	  that	  societies	  switched	  to	  agriculture	  as	  a	  response	  to	   life	   in	  what	  they	  perceived	  as	  a	  cruel	  and	  
capricious	  natural	  world.	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	   for	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  mind/body	  split,	  which	  came	  to	  
prominence,	  according	  to	  Harold	  Fromm's	  essay	  “From	  Transcendence	  to	  Obsolescence:	  A	  Road	  Map,”	  
as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  a	  nature	  men	  already	  perceived	  as	  antagonistic.	  	  
	  
Part	  of	  Western	  culture	  for	  millennia	  and	  most	  effectively	  popularized	  by	  Descartes'	  Meditations	  on	  First	  
Philosophy,	   the	   idea	   that	   man	   can	   be	   considered	   separately	   as	   soul	   and	   body	   severs	   him	   from	   the	  
natural	   world	   metaphysically	   as	   effectively	   as	   agriculture	   severs	   him	   in	   physical	   practice.	   Fromm	  
investigates	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  mind/body	  split	  on	  man	  ecocritically,	  arguing	  that	  our	  obsession	  with	  man-­‐
as-­‐rational-­‐mind	   has	   “been	   the	   product	   of	  man's	   sense	   of	   his	   own	   physical	  weakness,	   his	   knowledge	  
that	  Nature	   could	   not	   be	   tamed	  or	   bent	   to	   his	   own	  will”	   (30).	  Note	   two	  motivations	   here:	   one,	  man	  
realizes	  he	  cannot	  control	  nature's	  innate	  processes;	  two,	  man	  realizes	  that	  his	  body	  is	  tied	  to	  nature	  in	  
at	  least	  one	  insurmountable	  way:	  death.	  As	  Fromm	  explains:	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[T]here	  was	  never	  any	  serious	   likelihood	  that	  man	  could	  win	  the	  body-­‐mind	   	  battle	  on	  
the	  field	  of	  the	  body.	  If	  one	  found	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  produce	  ten	  children	  in	  order	  
to	  insure	  the	  survival	  of	  five,	  if	  one	  could	  be	  swept	  away	  by	  plagues	  that	  killed	  hundreds	  
of	  thousands,	  if	  one	  lost	  one's	  teeth	  by	  thirty,	  could	  not	  be	  certain	  of	  a	  food	  supply	  for	  
more	   than	   a	   few	   days,	   carted	   one's	   own	   excrements	   out	   to	   the	   fields	   or	   emptied	  
chamberpots	  out	  the	  window,	  one	  could	  hardly	  come	  to	  believe	  (despite	  man's	  fantastic	  
ability	   to	   believe	   almost	   anything)	   that	   one's	   ideal	   self	  would	   ever	   stand	   forth	  on	   the	  
field	  of	  the	  body,	  in	  the	  natural	  world.	  (30-­‐1)	  
Things	  have,	  of	  course,	  changed	  since	  the	  time	  of	  Plato	  or	  even	  of	  Descartes.	  Today	  one	  could	  make	  a	  
case	   that	  we	  may	  have	  –	  or	   soon	  will	  have	  –	   the	  ability	   to	  “stand	   forth	  on	   the	   field	  of	   the	  body”	  and	  
claim	   victory.	   The	   cost	   of	   this	   battle,	   though,	   is	   greater	   even	   than	   losing	   touch	  with	   our	   Pleistocene	  
instincts.	   Instead,	   according	   to	   Fromm,	   we	   lose	   touch	   with	   transcendence	   –	   spirituality	   –	   itself.	   “For	  
what,”	  he	  wonders,	  “after	  all,	  is	  so	  dreadfully	  unpleasant	  about	  contemporary	  Western	  middle-­‐class	  life	  
that	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   transcended?”	   (32).	   This	   inversely	   proportional	   relationship	   between	   physical	  
comfort	   and	   spiritual	   need	   has	   as	   its	   ultimate	   result	   a	   decline	   in	   religion	   in	   the	   West	   that	   began	  
simultaneously	  with	  European	  industrialism	  and	  continues	  to	  today	  (31).	  	  	  
	  
For	   Fromm,	   the	   endpoint	   of	   our	   obsession	   with	   Progress	   is	   an	   alteration	   in	   the	   very	   nature	   of	  
transcendence	   itself:	   spirituality	   no	   longer	   needs	   to	   exist	   because	   we	   no	   longer	   need	   to	   comfort	  
ourselves	  against	  the	  ravages	  that	  capricious	  Nature	  wreaks	  on	  our	  hapless	  bodies,	  but	  we	  instead	  feel	  a	  
need	  “based	  on	  satiety	  and	  not	  on	  deprivation,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  seek	  a	  haven	  in	  another	  world	  but	  rather	  
a	  more	   beautiful	   version	   of	   this	   one”	   (33).	   Once	   industrialized	   society	   had	   allowed	   us	   to	   be	   “mostly	  
unaware	  of	  a	  connection	  with	  Nature	  that	  has	  been	  artfully	  concealed	  by	  modern	  technology,”	  we	  had	  
the	  luxury	  to	  engage	  in	  nostalgia	  for	  “the	  way	  things	  used	  to	  be”	  (33).	  Nostalgia,	  specifically,	  for	  a	  way	  of	  
life	  that	  never	  actually	  existed,	  living	  “in	  tune	  with	  nature”	  –	  a	  concept	  we	  could	  only	  have	  created	  after	  
Falling	  out	  of	   tune	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   The	  primary	  way	   that	  ecocriticism	  engages	  with	   said	  nostalgia	   is	  
through	  the	  study	  of	  the	  literary	  trope	  known	  as	  the	  pastoral.	  	  
	  
In	  Ecocriticism,	  his	  survey	  of	  the	  field,	  Greg	  Garrard	  dates	  the	  modern	  pastoral	  back	  to	  the	  Romantics'	  
“poetic	   responses”	   to	   the	   Industrial	   Revolution	   (33).13	   Garrard	   lists	   three	   main	   characteristics	   of	   the	  
pastoral:	   “the	   specifically	   literary	   tradition,	   involving	   a	   retreat	   from	   the	   city	   to	   the	   countryside”;	   any	  
literature	   that	  contrasts	   the	   rural	  and	   the	  urban;	  and	   the	  “pejorative	  sense	   in	  which	   'pastoral'	   implies	  
and	   idealisation	   of	   rural	   life	   that	   obscures	   the	   realities	   of	   labour	   and	   hardship”	   (33).	   The	   pastoral	  
became	   immensely	   popular	   in	   colonial	   and	   then	   frontier	   America,	   due	   to	   a	   sort	   of	   cultural	   “perfect	  
storm”	   that	   Leo	  Marx	   describes	   in	   The	  Machine	   in	   the	   Garden:	   Technology	   and	   the	   Pastoral	   Idea	   in	  
America.	  Europeans	   in	  the	  throes	  of	  a	   literary	  pastoralism	  characterized	  by	  “[t]he	  ruling	  motive	  of	  the	  
good	  shepherd,	  leading	  figure	  of	  the	  classic,	  Virgilian	  mode,	  was	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  great	  world	  and	  
begin	  a	  new	  life	  in	  a	  fresh,	  green	  landscape”	  come	  upon	  a	  “virgin	  continent”	  (3).	  The	  timing	  ensured	  that	  
the	  pastoral	  was	  catapulted	  out	  of	  its	  literary	  frame	  and	  enacted	  upon	  the	  face	  of	  what	  would	  become	  
America.	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Nearly	   coincident	   with	   the	   seemingly	   inevitable	   American	   fascination	   with	   pastoral	   came	   a	   similar	  
fascination	  with	  technology,	  Progress,	  and	  –	  more	  specifically	  –	  steam	  power.	  Hence,	  “the	  machine	   in	  
the	  garden.”	  Marx	  muses:	  “Consider	  how	  the	  spectacle	  of	  the	  machine	  in	  a	  virgin	  land	  must	  have	  struck	  
the	  mind.	   Like	  nothing	  ever	   seen	  under	   the	   sun,	   it	   appears	  when	  needed	  most:	  when	   the	  great	  west	  
finally	  is	  open	  to	  massive	  settlement,	  when	  democracy	  is	  triumphant	  and	  gold	  is	  discovered	  […]	  here	  –	  
as	  if	  by	  design	  –	  comes	  a	  new	  power	  commensurate	  with	  the	  golden	  opportunity	  of	  all	  history”	  (206).	  If	  
we	  view	  the	  circumstances	  of	  mid-­‐1800s	  America	  through	  Marx's	  historical	  lens,	  is	  it	  any	  wonder	  that	  by	  
the	  early	  1900s	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  country	  would	  be	  quite	  literally	  farmed	  to	  death?	  	  	  
	  
Ultimately,	  the	  pastoral	  taken	  beyond	  the	  literary	  realm	  is	  no	  more	  free	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  industry	  than	  
nature	  is	  free	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  man.	  As	  Johnathan	  Bate	  puts	  it	  in	  The	  Song	  of	  the	  Earth:	  “You	  only	  
need	  Arcadia	  when	  your	  reality	  is	  Rome”	  (74).	  But	  where	  do	  you	  turn	  if	  there	  is	  no	  Arcadia	  left?	  	  Marx	  
wryly	   points	   out	   that	   today	   “An	   inchoate	   longing	   for	   a	   more	   'natural'	   environment	   enters	   into	   the	  
contemptuous	  attitude	  that	  many	  Americans	  adopt	   toward	  urban	   life	   (with	   the	  result	   that	  we	  neglect	  
our	  cities	  and	  desert	  them	  for	  the	  suburbs)”	  (5).	  How	  is	  the	  pastoral	  modified	  when	  there	  is	   little	  land	  
left	  to	  work,	  and	  when	  all	  of	  the	  arable	  land	  is	  worked	  by	  the	  employees	  of	  faceless	  megacorporations?	  	  
Marx	   has	   no	   answers,	   opining	   that	   “American	   writers	   seldom,	   if	   ever,	   have	   designed	   satisfactory	  
resolutions	  for	  their	  pastoral	  fables”	  (364)	  –	  for	  good	  reason,	  it	  seems.	  
	  
More	  recently,	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  pastoral	  –	  the	  mythification	  of	  pre-­‐industrial	  natural	  places	  –	  
can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  embodied	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  America's	  network	  of	  nature	  preserves,	  National	  Forests,	  
National	  and	  State	  Parks,	  and	  Wilderness	  Areas.	  These	  places	  conveniently	  remove	  the	  human	  element	  
that	  is	  so	  troubling	  in	  the	  pastoral	  through	  an	  ideological	  slight	  of	  hand	  that	  is	  written	  directly	  into	  the	  
legislation	   that	  makes	   the	   places	   possible.	   Consider	   the	   1964	  Wilderness	  Act	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  
term	  “wilderness”:	  	  
A	  wilderness,	  in	  contrast	  with	  those	  areas	  where	  man	  and	  his	  own	  works	  dominate	  the	  
landscape,	  is	  hereby	  recognized	  as	  an	  area	  where	  the	  earth	  and	  its	  community	  	  of	   life	  
are	  untrammeled	  by	  man,	  where	  man	  himself	  is	  a	  visitor	  who	  does	  not	  remain.	  An	  area	  
of	  wilderness	  is	  further	  defined	  to	  mean	  in	  this	  Act	  an	  area	  of	  undeveloped	  Federal	  land	  
retaining	  its	  primeval	  character	  and	  influence,	  without	  	  permanent	   improvements	   or	  
human	  habitation,	  which	  is	  protected	  and	  managed	  so	  	  as	   to	   preserve	   its	   natural	  
conditions[.]	  	  (“The	  Wilderness	  Act”)	  
Where	  to	  begin?	  	  The	  separation	  between	  “earth	  and	  its	  community	  of	  life”	  and	  man?	  	  The	  assignment	  
of	  a	  “primeval”	  character	  to	  the	  land?14	  Clearly,	  though	  many	  of	  these	  wilderness	  places	  were	  and	  are	  
still	  established	  with	  the	  best	  of	   intentions,	   they	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  encourage	  us	  to	  confront	  our	  basic	  
estrangement	   from	  nature;	   in	   fact,	   their	   existence	   is	   in	  many	  ways	   yet	   another	   reinforcement	   of	   the	  
same	  man/nature	  dichotomy.	  
	  
In	   his	   “Wilderness	   Letter”,	   Wallace	   Stegner	   advocates	   for	   a	   “geography	   of	   hope”	   (519)	   before	   the	  
encroaching	   forces	   of	   industry.	   His	   contention	   is	   that	   by	   setting	   up	  what	   he	   calls	   “wilderness	   banks”	  
(516),	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  freely	  develop	  the	  remaining	  surface	  of	  Earth,	  as	  that	  bank	  will	  be	  “good	  for	  our	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spiritual	   health	   even	   if	   we	   never	   once	   in	   ten	   years	   set	   foot	   in	   it”	   (515).	   But	   this	   “solution”	   is	   not	  
ecological	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Morton	  uses	  the	  term.	  It	  assumes	  a	  separation	  between	  Stegner's	  wilderness	  
bank	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	   rather	   than	   showing	   an	   awareness	   of	   the	   connectedness	   of	   a	  world	  
ecosystem.	   Stegner's	   solution	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   what	   happens	   in	   civilization	   effects	   the	  
wilderness	  and	  vice	  versa.	  A	   line	  drawn	  on	  a	  map	  or	  a	   set	  of	  gates	  closing	  off	  a	  park	  cannot	   stop	   the	  
movement	  of	  polluted	  groundwater	  or	  the	  fall	  of	  acid	  rain.	  	  
	  
We	  continue	  to	  lose	  awareness	  of	  our	  indebtedness	  to	  and	  our	  reliance	  upon	  the	  so-­‐called	  natural	  world	  
as	   our	   ability	   to	   convince	   ourselves	   that	   that	  world	   remains	   only	   as	   an	   item	   of	   curiosity	   or	   nostalgia	  
increases.	  Fromm	  summarizes	  this	  potentially	  deadly	  progression	  thusly:	  	  
[I]t	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  man	  has	  failed	  to	  see	  that	  now,	  as	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  roots	  of	  
his	  being	  are	  in	  the	  earth;	  and	  he	  has	  failed	  to	  see	  this	  because	  Nature,	  whose	  effects	  on	  
man	  were	   formerly	   immediate	   is	   now	  mediated	   by	   technology	   so	   that	   it	   appears	   that	  
technology	  and	  not	  Nature	  is	  actually	  responsible	  for	  everything.	  This	  has	  given	  to	  man	  
a	   sense	   that	   he	  mentally	   and	   voluntarily	   determines	   the	   ground	   of	   his	   own	   existence	  
and	  that	  his	  body	  is	  almost	  a	  dispensable	  adjunct	  of	  his	  being”	  (35).15	  	  	  
Considering	   the	   lengths	   we	   go	   to	   in	   our	   attempts	   to	   deny,	   obfuscate,	   outrun,	   and	   romanticize	   our	  
connection	  to	  the	  natural	  world,	  is	  it	  any	  wonder	  that	  it	  wasn't	  until	  after	  two	  World	  Wars	  and	  a	  nuclear	  
near-­‐miss	  that	  the	  we	  in	  the	  West	  began	  to	  acknowledge	  our	  ability	  to	  effect	  nature	  on	  a	   large	  scale?	  	  
Only	  now	   is	   the	  conversation	  over	  global	  warming	   reaching	  a	   fever	  pitch,	  yet	  compelling	  evidence	   for	  
the	  phenomenon	  existed	  over	  a	  century	  ago	  (McKibben	  8-­‐9).	  	  	  
	  
We	   are	   loath	   to	   give	   up	   our	  myth	   of	   Progress,	   though	  we	   find	   it	   necessary	   at	   times	   to	   reinforce	   our	  
resolve	   by	   resorting	   to	   simplistic	   reconstructions	   of	   the	   past	   –	   but	   the	   evidence	   is	   piling	   up.	   It	   is	  
becoming	  harder	  and	  harder	  to	  deny	  the	  fact	  that	  what	  we	  do	  on	  this	  Earth	  affects	  more	  than	  just	  us,	  
that	  not	  just	  our	  past	  but	  also	  our	  present	  and	  future	  are	  and	  will	  be	  determined	  in	  large	  part	  by	  how	  we	  
choose	   to	   enact	   “ecology.”	   “Thus,”	   Fromm	   argues,	   “'the	   problem	   of	   the	   environment,'	   which	   many	  
people	  persist	   in	  viewing	  as	  a	  peripheral	  arabesque	  drawn	  around	  the	   'important'	   concerns	  of	  human	  
life,	  must	  ultimately	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  central	  philosophic	  and	  ontological	  question	  about	  the	  self-­‐definition	  
of	   contemporary	  man”	   (38).	   Originally	   a	   discourse	   limited	   to	   investigating	   the	   intersections	   between	  
literature	  and	  the	  environment,	  ecocriticism	  has	  more	  recently	  expanded	  both	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
literary	  studies	  and	  across	  disciplinary	  lines,	  in	  part	  driven	  by	  this	  very	  question	  nipping	  at	  its	  heels:	  how	  
exactly	  do	  we	  successfully	  attack	  “the	  problem	  of	  the	  environment”?	  
	  
Is	  ecocritique	  an	  inherently	  political	  act?16	  If	  not,	  should	  it	  be?	  Where	  should	  we	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  
critique	   and	   action?	   Is	   our	   role	   as	   ecocritics	   simply	   to	   read	   about	   the	   environment	   and	   publish	   in	  
journals?	  Or	   should	  we	   be	   out	   on	   the	   Glen	   Canyon	  Dam	  with	   Abbey's	   George	   Hayduke,	   dynamite	   in	  
hand?	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Poetics	  vs.	  Policy:	  Must	  Ecocriticism	  Function	  Socially	  and	  Politically?	  	  
Surprisingly,	  there	  is	  comparatively	   little	  discussion	  within	  ecocriticism	  regarding	  its	  social	  and	  political	  
applications,	  or	   lack	  thereof.	  There	  are	  of	  course	  many	  historical	  examples	  of	   texts	   that	   fall	  under	  the	  
purview	   of	   ecocriticism	   affecting	   social	   and	   political	   change	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   natural	   world.	   Rachel	  
Carson's	  Silent	  Spring	   is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	   the	  spark	   that	   touched	  off	   the	  modern	  environmental	  
movement.	   Abbey's	   work,	   especially	   Desert	   Solitaire,	   had	   –	   and	   still	   has	   –	   an	   effect	   on	   Americans'	  
appreciation	  of	  their	  southwestern	  desert	  country.	  Wallace	  Stegner's	  “Wilderness	  Letter”	  has	  been	  used	  
time	  and	  again	  as	  a	  rallying	  cry	  for	  saving	  many	  remaining	  wilderness	  areas.	  Terry	  Tempest	  Williams	  and	  
Stephen	  Trimble's	  collection	  Testimony:	  Writers	  Speak	  on	  Behalf	  of	  Utah	  Wilderness	  was	  famously	  cited	  
by	  Bill	  Clinton	  as	  the	  motivation	  for	  the	  Grand	  Staircase-­‐Escalante	  National	  Monument.	  And,	  of	  course,	  
there	  are	  the	  writings	  of	  John	  Muir,	  which	  helped	  preserve	  much	  wilderness	  that	  might	  have	  otherwise	  
ended	  up	  under	  a	  bulldozer's	  tread.	  	  
	  
Muir	  is	  an	  interesting	  example,	  for	  he	  was	  not	  only	  a	  writer	  for	  the	  wilderness,	  but	  also	  an	  activist.	  He	  
began	   the	   Sierra	   Club,	   he	   hobnobbed	   with	   President	   Roosevelt	   and	   Gifford	   Pinchot,	   and	   he	   led	   the	  
charge	  for	  environmentalism	  by	  example.	  Is	  this	  what	  we	  should	  expect	  of	  ourselves	  as	  ecocritics?	  Are	  
we	   of	  more	   value	   if	  we	   enact	   our	   arguments	   in	   “the	   real	  world,”	   or	   are	  we	  most	   effective	  when	  we	  
choose	   not	   to	   venture	   out	   from	   behind	   the	   keyboard?	   	   Graham	   Huggan	   and	   Helen	   Tiffin's	   book	  
Postcolonial	   Ecocriticism	   addresses	   this	   question	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   meld	   ecocriticism	   with	   the	  
sociopolitical	  agenda	  of	  postcolonialism.	  
	  
Huggan	   and	   Tiffin	   raise	   the	   point	   that	   while	   ecocriticism	   often	   includes	   what	   they	   call	   an	   “advocacy	  
function”	  (13),	   it	   is	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  tell	  who	   it	   is	  advocating	   for.	  When	  we	  employ	  ecocriticism's	  
advocacy	   function,	   do	   we,	   like	   Thoreau,	   speak	   a	   word	   for	   nature?	   Do	   we	   speak	   for	   the	   people	   of	   a	  
specific	  place?	  Do	  we	  speak	  for	  all	  people?	  Can	  we	  speak	  for	  all	  people?	  Should	  we?	  Huggan	  and	  Tiffin's	  
postcolonial	  ecocriticism	  “preserves	  the	  aesthetic	  function	  of	  the	  literary	  text	  while	  drawing	  attention	  to	  
its	   social	   and	   political	   usefulness,	   its	   capacity	   to	   set	   out	   symbolic	   guidelines	   for	   the	   material	  
transformation	  of	   the	  world”	   (14).	   In	   this	  way,	   “postcolonial	  ecocriticism”	   lays	  a	  blueprint	   for	   twenty-­‐
first	   century,	  Abbey-­‐esque	  ecocritics	  who	  can	  wax	  poetic	  about	   the	  beauty	  of	   the	  desert	  while	  at	   the	  
same	   time	   urging	   readers	   to	   consider	   wilderness	   parks	   as	   potential	   bases	   for	   conducting	   guerrilla	  
warfare	  against	  an	  ecologically	  ignorant	  government.	  	  
	  
For	  another,	  less	  anarchic	  take	  on	  the	  ecocritic's	  place	  in	  the	  scheme	  of	  things,	  consider	  Bate's	  The	  Song	  
of	  the	  Earth,	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  “poetry	  –	  perhaps	  because	  of	  its	  rhythmic	  and	  mnemonic	  intensity	  
–	  is	  an	  especially	  efficient	  system	  for	  recycling	  the	  richest	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  of	  a	  community”	  (247).	  
Bate	  extrapolates	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  poet	  has	  a	  special	  significance	  in	  society	  through	  a	  sort	  of	  aesthetic	  
instantiation	  of	  James	  Lovelock's	  Gaia	  hypothesis,	  as	  he	  believes	  that:	  “Every	  time	  we	  read	  or	  discuss	  a	  
poem,	  we	  are	   recycling	   its	  energy	  back	   into	  our	   cultural	   environment”	   (247).	  Much	   like	  Morton,	  Bate	  
criticizes	  twentieth	  century	  literary	  theory	  in	  general,	  and	  ecocriticism	  in	  particular	  because	  it	  “could	  not	  
look	  out	  from	  the	  text	  to	  the	  planet.	  It	  was	  too	  busy	  manipulating	  the	  words	  'nature'	  and	  'man'	  to	  pay	  
any	  attention	  to	  man's	  manipulation	  of	  nature	  through	  technology”	  (248).	  He	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  search	  of	  a	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way	  to	  move	  language	  beyond	  a	  hermeneutic	  circle	  that	  neuters	  its	  usefulness	  in	  the	  situated,	  physical	  
world.	  	  
	  
Bate	  ultimately	  chooses	  to	  center	  on	  poetry	  specifically,	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  poetry	  can	  perform	  through	  
language	  a	  Heideggerian	  bringing-­‐forth.	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  via	  Heidegger:	  “When	  a	  tree	  brings	  itself	  
forth	  into	  blossom,	  it	  unconceals	  its	  being	  as	  a	  tree,	  whereas	  the	  unconcealing	  of	  the	  being	  of	  a	  chalice	  
is	  the	  work	  not	  of	  the	  chalice	  but	  of	  the	  craftsman”	  (253).	  For	  Heidegger,	  modern	  technology	  disrupts	  
this	   unconcealment,	   and	   “poetry	   is	   our	   way	   of	   stepping	   outside	   the	   frame	   of	   the	   technological,	   of	  
reawakening	  the	  momentary	  wonder	  of	  unconcealment”	  (258).	  Bate	  argues	  that	  poetry	  is	  unique	  across	  
writing	  in	  that	  it	  is	  “a	  form	  of	  being	  not	  of	  mapping”	  (262).	  His	  project	  throughout	  The	  Song	  of	  the	  Earth,	  
then,	   is	   to	   show	   that	   “a	  poem	   is	  not	  only	   a	  making	  of	   the	   self	   and	  a	  making	  of	   the	  world,	  but	   also	  a	  
response	   to	   the	   world	   and	   a	   respecting	   of	   the	   earth”	   (282).	   Perhaps	   this	   argument	   mitigates	   the	  
question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  ecocritics	   should	  be	   social	   and	  political	   animals	  –	   in	  Bate's	   view,	   they	  are	  
both	  intrinsically	  by	  what	  they	  do,	  and	  only	  need	  to	  continue	  doing	  just	  that	  to	  “save	  the	  earth”	  (283)	  
through	  poesis.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  Nature	  As	  Ecology	  
In	  his	  brilliant	  essay	  “The	  Comic	  Mode,”	  Joseph	  Meeker	  convincingly	  argues	  for	  a	  relationship	  between	  
ecology	  and	  comedy,	  between	  tragedy	  and	  industrial	  Progress	  (163).	  Meeker	  characterizes	  Progress-­‐as-­‐
tragedy	   thusly:	   “We	   demand	   that	   one	   species,	   our	   own,	   achieve	   unchallenged	   dominance	   where	  
hundreds	   of	   species	   lived	   in	   complex	   equilibrium	   before	   our	   arrival.	   In	   the	   present	   environmental	  
dilemma,	   humanity	   stands	   like	   a	   pioneer	   species	   facing	   heroically	   the	   consequences	   of	   its	   own	   tragic	  
behavior”	  (164).	  The	  catch	  here	  is,	  of	  course,	  that	  we	  desire	  to	  see	  ourselves	  this	  way	  –	  Meeker	  believes	  
that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  tragic	  hero	  is	  in	  our	  blood,	  so	  to	  speak.	  It	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  then	  that	  he	  
notes	  that	  “The	  intellectual	  presuppositions	  necessary	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  tragic	  literature	  have	  not	  been	  
present	   in	   all	   civilizations.	   It	   is	   conspicuously	   absent,	   for	   instance,	   in	   Oriental,	   Middle	   Eastern,	   and	  
primitive	   cultures”	   (157)	   –	   again,	   here,	   there	   is	   something	   particular	   about	   Western	   culture	   that	  
compels	   us	   to	   battle	   against	   the	   natural.	  Meeker's	   solution	   to	   this	   self-­‐identification	   dilemma	  echoes	  
Morton's	  argument	  for	  an	  ecological	  human	  society,	  and	  therefore	  I	   introduce	  my	  closing	  thoughts	  on	  
the	  value	  of	  ecocriticism	  by	  way	  of	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  two.	  	  
	  
Though	   I	   believe	  Morton's	   idea	  of	   “ecology	  without	  nature”	   is	   a	  necessary	   challenge	   to	   an	  ecocritical	  
discourse	  that	   is	  often	  too	  interested	  in	  studying	  “nature”	  as	  a	  quality,	  an	  idea	  and	  a	  place	  apart	  from	  
man	  and	  civilization,	  I	  find	  that	  Morton	  is	  hesitant	  to	  suggest	  a	  method	  of	  how	  we	  can	  accomplish	  such	  a	  
thing.	   In	  his	  essay,	  though,	  Meeker	  indirectly	  begins	  to	  lay	  out	  an	  idea	  of	  what	  an	  ecological	  humanity	  
might	  look	  like	  in	  his	  study	  of	  literary	  comedy:	  
Comedy	  demonstrates	   that	  man	   is	  durable	  even	   though	  he	  may	  be	  weak,	   stupid,	   and	  
undignified.	   As	   the	   tragic	   hero	   suffers	   or	   dies	   for	   his	   ideals,	   the	   comic	   hero	   survives	  
without	   them.	  At	   the	  end	  of	  his	   tale	  he	  manages	   to	  marry	  his	  girl,	  evade	  his	  enemies,	  
slip	   by	   the	   oppressive	   authorities,	   avoid	   drastic	   punishment,	   and	   to	   stay	   alive.	   His	  
victories	  are	   small,	   but	  he	   lives	   in	  a	  world	  where	  only	   small	   victories	  are	  possible.	  His	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career	   demonstrates	   that	  weakness	   is	   a	   common	   condition	   of	  mankind	   that	  must	   be	  
lived	  with,	  not	  one	  worth	  dying	  for.	  (159)	  
Meeker's	   idea	   of	   comedy	   seems	   to	   parallel	   the	   ultimate	   motivation	   for	   Morton's	   idea	   of	   “ecology	  
without	  nature”:	  the	  search	  for	  a	  way	  back	  to	  a	  pre-­‐Lapsarian	  understanding	  of	  nature,	  not	  necessarily	  
through	  a	  return	  to	  a	  hunting-­‐gathering	  lifestyle,	  or	  the	  forsaking	  of	  our	  possessions	  and	  technology,	  but	  
through	   a	   coordinated	   act	   of	   cultural	   awareness	   during	   which	   we	   forsake	   “metaphysical	   despair”	   in	  
order	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   “ritual	   renewal	   of	   biological	   welfare”	   (159).	   In	   an	   ecology	   without	   nature,	   we	  
choose	  to	  live	  the	  comic	  life	  of	  the	  animals	  over	  the	  tragic	  life	  of	  the	  human	  –	  the	  supposed	  non-­‐animal.	  
And	   why	   should	   we	   not?	   	   After	   all,	   consider	   how	   tragedies	   always	   end.	   Fromm	   invokes	   Faust,	  
appropriately,	  writing	  that	  “In	  the	  past,	  man's	  Faustian	  aspirations	  were	  seen	  against	  the	  background	  of	  
his	   terrifying	  weakness	   in	   the	   face	   of	   Nature.	   Today's	  man's	   Faustian	   posturings	   take	   place	   against	   a	  
background	   of	   arrogant,	   shocking,	   and	   suicidal	   disregard	   of	   his	   roots	   in	   the	   earth”	   (39).	   But	   how	   to	  
return	  to	  an	  eco-­‐comic	  life?	  	  	  
	  
I	   believe	   that	   this	   question	   is	   the	   most	   important	   one	   for	   future	   of	   ecocritics	   to	   tackle.	   If	   the	   most	  
fundamental	   originary	   question	   of	   ecocriticism	   deals	   with	   our	   severance	   from	   nature,	   our	   Fall,	   then	  
what	  better	  use	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  discipline	  than	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  how	  best	  to	  repair	  that	  
severance?	   	  As	  one	  potential	  answer,	   I'd	   like	   to	   suggest	  an	  alteration	   to	  “ecology	  without	  nature.”	  As	  
much	  as	  I	  appreciate	  Morton's	  means,	  I	  find	  his	  end	  unsatisfactory,	  and	  worse,	  potentially	  destructive.	  
Indicating	   the	   fundamental	   necessity	   of	   abandoning	   the	   man/nature	   dichotomy	   is	   the	   brilliance	   of	  
Morton's	  project,	   and	  yet	   I	   cannot	   follow	  him	   through	   to	   the	  point	   at	  which	  we	  abandon	   the	   idea	  of	  
“nature”	  completely.	  Too	  many	  steps	  back	  towards	  an	  ecological	  way	  of	   living	  have	  been	  taken	   in	  the	  
name	  of	  “nature,”	  especially	  in	  the	  last	  fifty	  years	  of	  Western	  society,	  to	  simply	  toss	  out	  the	  idea	  in	  all	  its	  
forms.	  “Nature”	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  rallying	  cry	  for	  exactly	  the	  type	  of	  ecological	  living	  that	  Morton	  
and	  Meeker	  advocate	  for.	  Therefore,	  in	  place	  of	  an	  “ecology	  without	  nature”	  I	  would	  suggest	  “nature	  as	  
ecology.”	  	  
	  
What	  would	  happen	  if,	   instead	  of	  abolishing	  “nature”	  from	  our	  minds,	  we	  began	  thinking	  of	  nature	  as	  
everything	   within	   the	   world	   ecosystem?	   Ecology	   without	   nature	   leaves	   us	   with	   the	   unintended	  
consequence	   of	   having	   to	   navigate	   the	   idea	   that	   without	   nature,	   everything	   is	   unnatural.	   Including	  
ourselves,	  our	  buildings,	  our	  cities,	  our	  cars	  and	  even	  our	  oil	  spills	  and	  strip	  mining	  and	  clear-­‐cutting	  as	  
part	  of	  nature	  allows	  us	  to	  navigate	  the	  mounting	  environmental	  catastrophe	  from	  an	  ecological	  point	  
of	  view	  –	  how	  can	  we	  not	  live	  ecologically	  if	  we	  are	  part	  of	  nature?	  –	  but	  it	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  wield	  all	  the	  
positive	  force	  of	  “nature”	  while	  minimizing	  the	  negative	  repercussions	  that	  the	  idea	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  in	  
the	  past.	  	  
	  
Our	  relationship	  with	  what	  we	  still	  choose	  to	  see	  as	  the	  non-­‐human	  world	  is	  changing	  dramatically	  –	  to	  a	  
degree	  this	   is	  now	  out	  of	  our	  hands.	  We	  have	  already,	   in	  a	  sense,	  overridden	  nature,	  as	  Bill	  McKibben	  
argues	  when	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  “We	  have	  changed	  the	  atmosphere,	  and	  thus	  we	  are	  changing	  the	  
weather.	  By	  changing	  the	  weather,	  we	  make	  every	  spot	  on	  earth	  man-­‐made	  and	  artificial”	  (54).	  Are	  we	  
animals,	  deluding	  ourselves	  into	  thinking	  otherwise,	  or	  are	  we	  a	  special	  case,	  made	  so	  by	  our	  ability	  to	  
modify	  our	   environment	  on	  a	   global	   scale?	   It	   is	   becoming	   clear	   that	  both	   are	   true.	  What	  better	  way,	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then,	  for	  us	  to	  reconcile	  our	  effects	  on	  the	  globe	  with	  an	  ecological	  mode	  of	  living	  that	  recasts	  nature	  as	  
ecology?	   There	   is	   no	   better	   project	   for	   ecocriticism	   than	   finding	   a	  way	   for	   us	   post-­‐Lapsarian	   apes	   to	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Among	   others,	   Harold	   Fromm	   suggests	   Rueckert's	   1976	   essay	   “Literature	   and	   Ecology:	   An	   Experiment	   in	  
Ecocriticism”	  as	  the	  origin	  for	  the	  term	  in	  his	  foreword	  to	  Glotfelty's	  Reader.	  Rueckert's essay is also reprinted 
in that same collection.	  
2	   Though	  part	  of	  my	  goal	   in	   this	   section	   is	   to	  problematize	  our	  use	  of	   and	  assumptions	  about	   the	  word/idea	  
“nature”,	   it	   is	   perhaps	   a	   testament	   to	   its	   metonymic	   ubiquity	   that	   I	   find	   myself	   unable	   to	   do	   so	   without	  
resorting	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  the	  use	  of	  terms	  like	  “natural”	  or	  “natural	  world”	  as	  contemporary	  Western	  culture	  
would	  typically	  understand	  them,	  as	  I	  do	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
3	   Consider	  Rachel	  Carson's	  Silent	  Spring	  and	  it's	  effect	  on	  the	  modern	  environmental	  movement,	  for	  example.	  
4	   Abbey	  himself	  refused	  the	  label	  of	  “nature	  writer”	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  he	  saw	  Desert	  Solitaire	  as	  	  “the	  plain	  
and	  simple	  account	  of	  a	   long	  sweet	  season	  lived	  in	  one	  of	  the	  world's	  most	  splendid	  places”	  (Abbey	  xii)	  and	  
thus	  not	  worthy	  of	  critical	  investigation.	  	  
5	   Scheese	  fails	  to	  note	  that	  Abbey	  claimed	  to	  have	  intentionally	  avoided	  reading	  Muir,	  having	  not	  seen	  the	  point	  
of	   reading	   those	   nature	  writers	  who	   in	   his	   eyes	   failed	   to	   go	   “far	   beyond	   simple	   nature	  writing	   to	   become	  
critics	  of	  society,	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  of	  our	  modern	  industrial	  culture”	  (Abbey	  xi).	  	  
6	   For	  some	  more	  mythic-­‐age	  examples	  of	  this	  frequent	  trope,	  consider,	  among	  others,	  the	  Cain	  and	  Abel	  story	  
and	  the	  Epic	  of	  Gilgamesh.	  	  
7	   For	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  essay,	  unless	  otherwise	  stated,	  “agriculture”	  will	  mean	  specifically	  “settled	  agriculture”,	  as	  
there	  are	  of	  course	  nomadic	  forms	  of	  agriculture	  as	  well,	  and	  those	  practices	  don't	  necessarily	  imply	  the	  same	  
set	  of	  values	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  land	  that	  settled	  agriculture	  does.	  	  
8	   Obviously	  a	  lengthier	  discussion	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  essay;	  to	  learn	  more,	  consider	  Karen	  Armstrong's	  
A	  History	  of	  God	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  	  
9	   For	  a	   lengthier	  discussion	  of	   the	  effect	  of	   the	  Bible	  on	  Western	  culture	  at	   large,	   I	   recommend	  starting	  with	  
Herbert	  Schneidau's	  The	  Sacred	  Discontent:	  The	  Bible	  and	  Western	  Tradition.	  	  
10	   Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	   the	  evidence	   that	  prehistoric	   society	  was	  no	  more	  “primitive”	   than	  our	  own.	  
Consider	   this	  excerpt	   from	  Max	  Oelschlager's	  The	   Idea	  of	  Wilderness:	  From	  Prehistory	  to	  the	  Age	  of	  Ecology	  
that	  sums	  up	  the	  argument	  nicely:	  “The	  claim	  that	  Paleolithic	  life	  was	  short	  is	  problematic	  and	  controversial.	  
Modern	  medicine	  has	  increased	  the	  survival	  rate	  of	  infants	  and	  has	  made	  major	  strides	  in	  dealing	  with	  trauma,	  
thus	  creating	  an	  appearance,	   resting	  on	  statistical	  artifact,	   that	   the	  human	   life	   span	  has	  been	   increased	   […]	  
The	  modern	  mind	   is	   oblivious	   to	   the	   reality	   that	   starvation,	  malnutrition,	  warfare,	   and	  pestilence	   are	   post-­‐
Neolithic	   phenomena	   and	   therefore	   probably	   a	   consequence	   of	   urbanization,	   explosive	   population	   growth,	  
and	  the	  socioeconomics	  of	  agri-­‐culture	  […]	  Further,	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  we	  have	  surpassed	  our	  
prehistoric	  kin	   in	  cognitive	  powers	  and	  achievements.	  The	  intellectual	   life	  of	  hunter-­‐gatherers	  was	  as	  rich	  as	  
that	  of	  modern	  people,	  and	  the	  rate	  of	  intellectual	  innovation,	  as	  well	  as	  technological	  and	  artistic	  creativity,	  
also	  appears	  to	  be	  roughly	  equivalent.	  Civilized	  people	  do	  have	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  past	  to	  augment	  their	  efforts,	  
but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  neocortex	  has	  evolved”	  (15).	  	  
11	   Consider,	  among	  others,	  Charles	  A.	  Reed's	  essay	  collection	  Origins	  of	  Agriculture.	  
12	   I	  distinguish	  here	  between	  the	  advent	  of	   industrial	  agriculture	  (as	  White	  describes	  above)	  and	  the	   Industrial	  
Revolution,	   as	   I	   see	   the	   former	   to	   be	   a	   development	   spurred	   by	   an	   invention	   and	   the	   latter	   to	   be	   a	  
development	  spurred	  by	  a	  widespread	  ideology.	  Considering	  the	  thrust	  of	  this	  essay,	  it	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  
consider	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Industrial	   Age	   to	   be	   the	   late	   1700s,	   coincident	   with	   the	   rising	   popularity	   in	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England	  of	  the	  Romantic	  poets	  and	  their	  awareness	  of	  industrialism's	  environmental	  effects	  (aesthetically,	  at	  
least,	  if	  not	  scientifically).	  	  
13	   Garrard,	  among	  others,	  traces	  this	  literary	  trope	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  Virgil	  and	  Theocritus,	  but	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
brevity	  I	  will	  pick	  up	  discussing	  it	  here	  as	  it	  takes	  shape	  in	  the	  American	  frontier,	  as	  the	  American	  form	  of	  the	  
pastoral	  is	  more	  germane	  to	  my	  larger	  discussion	  in	  this	  essay.	  
14	   The	  OED's	  first	  definition	  for	  “primeval”	  is	  “Primal,	  original,	  primitive;	  spec.	  of	  or	  relating	  to	  the	  earliest	  history	  
of	  the	  world”	  (“Primeval”,	  adj.).	  I	  would	  argue,	  based	  on	  the	  observer's	  inherent	  effect	  on	  the	  observed,	  that	  
no	   place	   on	   earth	   can	   now	   rightly	   be	   described	   as	   “primal”,	   “original”,	   or	   “primitive.”	   As	   a	   rather	   blatant	  
example	  of	  this,	  consider	  Google	  Earth.	  	  	  
15	   The	   extremity	   of	   this	   renewed	   disassociation	   with	   the	   body	   –	   not	   the	   mind/body	   split,	   per	   se,	   but	   the	  
technology/body	   split,	   if	   you	   will	   –	   is	   seen	   in	   the	   discipline	   of	   posthumanism.	   Huggan	   and	   Tiffin	   charge	  
posthumanism	   with	   being	   anti-­‐ecological	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   “a	   point	   of	   view	   characterised	   by	   the	  
assumption	   that	  embodiment	   is	   an	  historical	   accident	   rather	   than	  a	  biological	  necessity”	   (207),	   a	   viewpoint	  
that,	  from	  an	  ecocritical	  standpoint,	  we	  clearly	  indulge	  at	  our	  peril.	  	  
16	   In	  Ecology	  Without	  Nature,	  Morton	  uses	  the	  term	  “ecocritique”	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  way;	  here,	  I	  simply	  use	  it	  to	  
indicate	  the	  act	  of	  applying	  ecocriticism.	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